We show that individuals' macroeconomic expectations are influenced by their socioeconomic status (SES). People with higher income or higher education are more optimistic about future macroeconomic developments, including business conditions, the national unemployment rate, and stock market returns. The spread in beliefs between highand low-SES individuals diminishes significantly during recessions. A comparison with professional forecasters and historical data reveals that the beliefs wedge reflects excessive pessimism on the part of low-SES individuals. SES-driven expectations help explain why higher-SES individuals are more inclined to invest in the stock market and more likely to consider purchasing homes, durable goods, or cars. (
asset prices and macroeconomic dynamics (e.g., Sims 2008; Geanakoplos 2009; Piazzesi and Schneider 2012; Guzman and Stiglitz 2015) . Consumption and investment choices induced by differences in beliefs may have further welfare consequences (Brunnermeier, Simsek, and Xiong 2014) , yet the origins of this disagreement are still not well understood.
In this paper, we show that heterogeneity in macroeconomic expectations is associated with individuals' socioeconomic status (SES), measured by income and education. Our empirical analysis is motivated by experimental evidence. Kuhnen and Miu (2017) found that experimental subjects from low-SES backgrounds were more pessimistic about the payoff distributions of risky assets than subjects from high-SES backgrounds. Moreover, this gap in expectations between low-and high-SES individuals arose after good news about the payoff distribution was revealed in the experiment, but not after bad news. We build on this experimental work by analyzing the relationship between people's SES and their degree of optimism about the macroeconomy, as well as the dynamics of beliefs over the business cycle. We use monthly data from the Michigan Survey of Consumers (MSC) spanning nearly four decades.
We start by examining SES-related unconditional heterogeneity in expectations regarding future stock market returns, the national unemployment rate, and general business conditions. We find that within virtually every month during our almost four-decade sample, for each one of those expectations measures, and for both income rank within year-age groups and education as SES measures, high-SES respondents in the survey are more optimistic than low-SES respondents. These differences in beliefs are substantial, even after controlling for other demographic characteristics, age effects, and time fixed effects. For example, moving from the lowest to highest income quintile implies a change in macroeconomic optimism that is about the same magnitude as a third of a typical peak-to-trough movement over the business cycle in the monthly average beliefs in the Michigan Survey. Having a college degree corresponds to a beliefs difference of about 6% of a typical peak-to-trough movement.
We then turn to the business-cycle dynamics of the beliefs wedge between high-and low-SES people. We show that the wedge is procyclical. During recessions, the macroeconomic expectations of high-and low-SES individuals are similar, but the wedge widens substantially in times of good macroeconomic performance. Thus, there is a remarkable consistency in the behavior of the beliefs wedge in our long sample of survey data and in the experimental evidence that motivates our analysis.
As in the experimental data in Kuhnen and Miu (2017) , we find that high-SES individuals make forecasts that are, on average, closer to objective forecasts than those of low-SES individuals. We compare macroeconomic expectations from the MSC with matched forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), and beliefs about future stock returns from the MSC with long-run historical realizations of stock market index returns. Based on these proxies for objective forecasts, we find that forecasts of high-SES individuals are, indeed, less biased than those of low-SES individuals.
Having established the basic facts about the unconditional and the dynamic properties of SES-related heterogeneity in macroeconomic expectations, we examine in more detail the mechanism that leads to the correlation between SES and macroeconomic beliefs. A potential alternative theory to our baseline hypothesis of a causal effect of SES on macroeconomic expectations is that there is an underlying fixed personal characteristic-for example, vulnerability to depression-that causes both general pessimism as well as poor economic choices that lead to low SES (see, e.g., Puri and Robinson 2007) . Relatedly, one could worry about reverse causality, where pessimism causes economic choices that subsequently lead to low SES. However, using the panel subsample of the MSC in which respondents are reinterviewed once, after six months, we can difference out unobserved fixed personal characteristics. Doing so, we still find a strong positive relationship between changes in income and changes in macroeconomic optimism. These differenced results also make clear that reverse causality is unlikely to explain our results because a potentially plausible effect of beliefs changes on SES changes would take much longer than a few months to materialize. Furthermore, using the full MSC sample, we find that respondents who report a recent positive change in their personal financial situation or receipt of good economic news, as well as those who reside in geographic areas with positive recent changes in economic conditions, have more optimistic macroeconomic beliefs. These proxies for experienced changes absorb part of the explanatory power of the SES variables. Taken together, all of these results indicate that macroeconomic beliefs are responsive to recent changes in individuals' perceived economic circumstances, which does not fit well with fixed effects or reverse causality stories.
As a final step in our analysis, we show that differences in beliefs associated with individuals' socioeconomic standing help explain their economic behavior. Since the MSC offers data on beliefs about macroeconomic conditions, as well as information about respondents' actual or intended choices, such as stock market investment decisions and attitudes toward purchasing homes, durables, or cars, we can quantify the effect of SES through the beliefs channel on these choices. We find that while SES measures like income or education on their own directly predict the interest in investing in stocks, or buying homes, durables, or cars, there exist indirect effects of income and education through the belief channel that account for a significant fraction of the total effect of the SES variables on these decisions-for example, close to 25% in the case of home-buying attitudes. We also specifically analyze stock market investment decisions and beliefs regarding stock returns in particular, and find that SESinduced beliefs account for a significant fraction, up to 47%, of the total effect of the SES variables, namely, income and education, on the decision to invest, and on the share of income invested in equities.
At a deeper psychological level, a number of mechanisms could potentially generate the pro-cyclical wedge in macroeconomic expectations between high-and low-SES individuals. One possibility is that low-SES individuals underappreciate the informativeness of public signals about the macroeconomy relative to (pessimistic) prior beliefs formed based on their personal economic environment. The expectations evidence can also be explained with a variant of the local thinking framework of Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010) and Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2012) in which a low-SES individual neglects good states of the world that she does not view as representative. Alternatively, the timevarying pessimism could also be generated by a confirmation bias as in Rabin and Schrag (1999) if low-SES individuals have a tendency to misinterpret good macroeconomic signals as bad signals. We offer tentative evidence based on a variable in the MSC that records the extent to which survey respondents have heard positive or negative business news. We find that news perception of highand low-SES individuals is similar on average, but low-SES individuals report less positive news heard in booms and less negative news heard in recessions. This symmetric pattern fits well with the misperceived signal informativeness theory, but it is not predicted by the local thinking and confirmation bias theories. While we do not view these tests based on a rather crude measure of signal perception as conclusive, they are suggestive of a role for misperceived signal informativeness. It would be interesting for future research to investigate this channel with a more refined measure of signal perception, perhaps ideally with experiments in the field or laboratory.
In terms of economic implications, the results in this paper can help shed light on the empirical pattern documented by Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) , Campbell (2006) , and Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2007) that households with lower education, income, or wealth are substantially less likely to participate in the stock market.
The causes of nonparticipation are still unclear. Standard explanations involve participation costs (Vissing-Jorgensen 2002), but they still appear to leave a substantial part of the non-participation unexplained (Andersen and Nielsen 2011) . Our findings indicate that beliefs could be part of the explanation for why some individuals do not participate: whatever the actual cost or perceived cost of participation, pessimistic expectations lead to lower perceived benefits from participation and hence to low rates of participation of low-SES individuals.
Stock market nonparticipation can imply welfare losses for households, as discussed in Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2007) . Thus, pessimistic macroeconomic expectations can have welfare consequences for low-SES individuals. Moreover, nonparticipation of low-SES households could result in heterogeneity in wealth returns that is correlated with the level of wealth, which in turn plays a role in generating wealth inequality (Favilukis 2013; Gabaix et al. 2016) . By limiting their investment opportunity set, pessimistic low-SES households may perpetuate their disadvantaged financial position.
Pessimistic expectations about future business conditions or unemployment could further induce individuals from low-SES backgrounds to have low levels of investments along other dimensions also, such as starting a new business, or pursuing higher education or better health. While there is no direct evidence for this implication of our work, existing relevant findings seem to support it. For example, Kearney and Levine (2016) document that children from lower-SES families are more likely to drop out of high school, relative to their betteroff peers, and attribute this to more pessimistic subjective estimates of the likelihood of economic success among lower-SES individuals. In this sense, our results also connect to the theory of Piketty (1995) in which individuals draw on the personal economic experience of their family dynasties to form beliefs about the returns to effort in the economy.
Our work on macroeconomic expectations builds on earlier work that is focused on stock return beliefs. Kezdi and Willis (2011) document links between income and education and stock market return beliefs using a sample of 55-to 64-year-olds from the Health and Retirement Study. Their estimation is based on a single survey wave from 2002. Kuhnen and Miu (2017) complement their experimental work with evidence on SES-related stock return beliefs heterogeneity based on a single Qualtrics survey cross-section. Our finding in this paper that SES-related beliefs heterogeneity is subject to strong business cycle dynamics-with the beliefs wedge between high-and low-SES individuals almost disappearing during recessions-highlights that it is important to study samples with a much longer time dimension. Moreover, we show that SES variables are related to macroeconomic expectations more generally, not just stock return expectations.
Our work is further related to an emerging literature showing that individuals' macroeconomic expectations are influenced by personal circumstances that are specific to an individual or a group of people. While our focus is on an individual's current economic situation, which is strongly influenced by a person's history of idiosyncratic shocks and initial conditions, earlier work has found links between the macroeconomic history that individuals of a given cohort have experienced and their expectations and investment decisions. Individuals in cohorts that experienced bad macroeconomic conditions subsequently avoid risky financial choices, either as investors (Malmendier and Nagel 2011) or as managers (Malmendier and Tate 2005; Malmendier, Tate, and Yan 2011) . Evidence in support of this beliefs channel is provided by Malmendier and Nagel (2016) , who find that differences in inflation experiences across cohorts strongly predict differences in the expectations of these cohorts regarding future inflation levels. Experimental evidence in Kuhnen (2015) shows that individuals faced with sequences of negative payoffs form overly pessimistic beliefs about the quality of the available investments. Kuchler and Zafar (2016) show that individuals' expectations about national U.S. house prices depend on their personally experienced house price history in their local geographic area, and expectations about the national unemployment rate are influenced by personal experiences of unemployment. 1 A common thread in these studies is that expectations about a macroeconomic variable (e.g., house prices) are related to personal experiences of the realized cohort-specific or geographically local history of the same variable. In contrast, the effect that we study is one where a person's own economic situation is correlated with a broad range of macroeconomic expectations.
Data
Our data span the period 1978-2014, at a monthly frequency. Each month, approximately 400 individuals are recruited for the Michigan Survey of Consumers and are asked to express their beliefs about future values of several macroeconomic variables. The survey is based on a nationally representative group of respondents, sampled using landline and cellular phone numbers (Curtin and Dechaux 2015) . In our analysis, we weight observations with the household sample weights provided by the MSC. These sample weights adjust, among other things, for differential non-response by demographic characteristics. 2 In total, there are 189,590 person-month observations in our sample. The macro belief variables we study are P ST K, BUS12, BUS5, BEXP , and UNEMP . Table 1 presents the survey questions used to measure the belief variables, and the respondents' possible answers. P ST K is the respondent's subjective probability that the U.S. stock market will have a positive return over the next 12 months. BUS12, BUS5, and BEXP measure expectations about the evolution of the overall business environment over the following 12 months or five years, and UNEMP measures expectations about the evolution of the national unemployment rate over the following 12 months. We rescale the belief variables except P ST K to vary between -1 and 1, and we set the sign such that higher values imply optimism. To calculate an aggregate measure of macroeconomic optimism, we standardize each of these individual beliefs and average the standardized values. Because P ST K is only available starting in June 2002, OP T I NDX is the average of four standardized beliefs (BUS12, BUS5, BEXP , and UNEMP ) prior to that time, and it is the average of five standardized beliefs (BUS12, BUS5, BEXP , UNEMP , and P ST K) after that month.
One could be concerned with the inclusion of P ST K in our OP T I NDX measure because the P ST K-related question is worded in a way that may be difficult for an average respondent to understand. Relatedly, stock market 1 Amonlirdviman (2007) documents that people with low income or education are more pessimistic about their own personal situation, and presents a model in which these individuals suffer from low self-control, and the optimal response to self-control problems is to become defensively pessimistic about one's future prospects.
2 Curtin, Presser, and Singer (2002) investigate the role of survey non-response on expectations collected by the MSC and find that demographic characteristics, including income and education, do not have sizable effects on the probability of agreeing to be part of the survey. Moreover, the authors find no evidence that the likelihood of participating in the survey is a function of the respondents' macroeconomic optimism. beliefs may be inherently different from other macroeconomic beliefs because investing in equities could be an unfamiliar or irrelevant topic for some households. Moreover, a data-driven weighting of the five belief measures in OP T I NDX may be preferable instead of simply equally weighting them. In unreported results we experiment with alternative specifications of 
In one case we exclude P ST K from our index; in another, we use the first principal component weights to construct our OP T I NDX.
We find that these alternative constructions of the OP T I NDX measure yield qualitatively similar results, in terms of both point estimates and significance in our main regressions. We choose income and education as indicators of the socioeconomic status of households. We restrict our analysis to individuals 24 to 75 years old because income or college degree completion may not be meaningful SES measures for very old or very young adults. Next we create percentiles of real income (in 2014 dollars) within each year and age group (25-29, 30-34, ... 70-74) , which we then divide by 100 and label Income Rank. Therefore, a change of one percentile implies an income rank change of 0.01, and a change of 10 percentiles implies an income rank change of 0.1. We use this as one of the socioeconomic status variables because relative income compared to peers may matter more than dollar income, but we obtain broadly similar effects if we use dollar income rather than income rank. College Degree is a binary variable that takes a value of one if the respondent has at least a college degree.
To measure recent changes in an individual's personal economic situation, we use the variable 1-Yr Change in Personal Situation, provided in the Michigan survey for each respondent, which takes values -1, 0, or 1 if the individual reports being worse off, the same, or better off than a year ago in terms of their personal finances. For a more objective measure of changes in the individual's economic environment, we use data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics on the unemployment level and data on per-capita income from Bureau of Economic Analysis of the county where the respondent resides. 3 Table 2 presents summary statistics for the variables that capture the personal economic situation, beliefs, and household economic choices of the individuals in the sample. In our data, 34.1% of people have completed at least a college degree. The median real household income (in 2014 dollars) of the participants in the survey is $57,591, but there are clear outliers in the income distribution, as can be seen in Table 2 . The average value for the overall amount a person has invested in equities as of the time of the survey is about 85% of the annual income of that individual.
Given the construction of the aggregate belief measure OP T I NDX as a mean of standardized variables, in our sample spanning 1978-2014 the average OP T I NDX is close to zero. The average estimates for BUS12 and BUS5, which are beliefs regarding whether there will be good or bad economic times over the next 12 months or five years, are -0.014 and -0.084, respectively. Given that the scale for these two variables spans -1 to 1, these averages indicate that expectations about future economic times have not been overly pessimistic or overly optimistic during the 37 years studied here. The same holds true for BEXP , the belief regarding general business conditions over the next year, whose average in the sample is 0.075. The belief regarding whether unemployment will be lower or higher over the next year, UNEMP , has the most negative sample average, -0.195, indicating that survey participants were the most pessimistic about this particular aspect of future economic conditions. During 2002-2014, the time frame for which this measure is available, the have the actual county identifiers. The county-level data could only be merged in for MSC observations during 2000-2014. The merging is done such that the county unemployment level is as of the month preceding the survey and the county per-capita income is as of the year preceding the survey. This is done to reflect the most current information available to the respondents. average estimate of P ST K, the probability that a U.S. stock market investment would increase in value in the next 12 months, is 48.3%, with a standard deviation of 29.3%.
We also use several variables that capture the individuals' decisions regarding stock market investments, namely whether they invest in equity (I nvest), as well as the share of income invested in the stock market (Invest Share) and their attitudes at the time of the survey towards buying a home (H OM), durables (DU R), or cars (CAR). About 62% of individuals in our sample participate in the stock market, and on average, responses regarding whether it is a good time to purchase a home, durables, or cars are positive. For example, the variable H OM, which can take values of -1, 0, or 1, indicating either negative, neutral, or positive attitudes towards buying a home, has an average of 0.384, and thus is more tilted toward the positive end of the response scale.
Expectations Heterogeneity by Socioeconomic Status

Beliefs and SES
We start by examining differences in macroeconomic expectations by SES, measured along the dimensions of income and education. Figure 1 plots the monthly average values of our optimism index, OP T I NDX, for individuals in the highest and lowest income quintiles (in their respective age groups) from 1978 to 2014. The figure shows that there is a remarkably persistent wedge in beliefs between high-and low-SES individuals: In almost every month during the sample period, individuals with higher income or higher education had more optimistic macroeconomic expectations. Moreover, the disagreement between households of different SES is procyclical. During recessions, it shrinks to close to zero.
Among the different macroeconomic expectations variables, we are particularly interested in beliefs about future stock market returns, as we have the most direct measures of closely related economic decisions-stock market investments-for this type of belief. Figure 2 plots the monthly averages of P ST K, individuals' stated probability that the U.S. stock market will have a positive return over the following 12 months, for high-and low-SES groups. As the figure shows, the time series of the P ST K beliefs wedge looks very similar to the wedge in OP T I NDX that we examined earlier: High-SES individuals are more optimistic than low-SES individuals in virtually every month throughout the whole sample in which P ST K is available and the wedge is procyclical.
Additional figures in Online Appendix A show that there exists an SES-induced wedge in beliefs for each component of the optimism index OP T I NDX (in addition to P ST K)-namely, BUS5, BUS12, BEXP , and UNEMP -and that recessions lead to a lower SES-related gap for each of these types of macroeconomic expectations. Table 3 presents these results more formally in terms of a regression. Dependent variables in the models in the table are measures of macroeconomic expectations: the aggregate optimism measure OP T I NDX in the first column, and its separate components in the following five columns. Independent
Figure 2 Stock market expectations during 2002-2014 by SES level
Expectations refer to individuals' stated probability that the U.S. stock market will have a positive return over the following 12 months. Data are monthly. Income quintiles are defined within year-age groups. Shaded areas represent NBER recession periods.
variables include the person's income rank as a percentile (defined with respect to the person's year-age group), an indicator for whether the person has a college degree or higher education, and interactions of an NBER recession indicator with the two SES measures. 4 All regressions in the paper also include fixed effects for the year-month of the survey, as well as indicators for the respondents' age, gender, and marital status. Standard errors are clustered by time, specifically by year-month, as well as by respondent.
In line with the patterns seen in the figures, Table 3 shows that people's SES characteristics are highly significant predictors of their beliefs regarding future macroeconomic conditions (P ST K, BUS12, BUS5, BEXP , and UNEMP ), as well as of their aggregate optimism index, OP T I NDX. For each of our five measures of beliefs, we find that having a higher income rank among people in the same age category and in the same year, and having a college degree, are significant predictors of the level of optimism in the respondents' expectations. When the dependent variable captures expectations about future stock market returns (P ST K), we find that during non-recession months, for an increase from the lowest to the highest rank of respondents' income, the probability they estimate for the U.S. stock market to have a positive return over the next year increases by 16.4%. People with at least a college degree on average believe that the probability of positive stock market return is 7.2% higher than do people without a college education.
Similarly, we find that during non-recession months, those with higher SES have significantly more optimistic expectations for BUS12, BU S5, BEXP , and UNEMP and have higher values for the overall belief measure OP T I NDX. For example, an increase of a person's income rank from the lowest to the highest rank leads to an average increase of 0.304 in OP T I NDX. A change by one quintile (20 percentiles) in income rank leads to an increase of 0.304× 0.2 ≈ 0.06 in OP T I NDX. Having a college degree has a similar effect, as it leads to an increase in OPTINDX of 0.058. All of these effects are statistically significant at p <0.05 or better.
To allay concerns about overstating the significance and stability of these estimates, we re-run the models in Table 3 , but only in the subsample of firsttime participants in the MSC. The results are similar, as shown in Table A2 in the Online Appendix. We also re-run our main regressions from Table 3 by splitting the sample in halves, as well as in thirds, and find that the effects are not driven by a small subsample of years.
Judging the economic significance of the results in Table 3 is not quite straightforward, as the survey-based beliefs measures we use as dependent variables have quite substantial measurement noise, including occasionally nonsensical outliers. One way to gauge the economic significance is to compare the cross-sectional variation related to the SES variables with typical business cycle time-variation in the macroeconomic belief variables. Based on Figure 1 we can see that OP T I NDX averaged across high-and low-income groups moves, at the most extreme, by about one unit from peak to trough during the business cycle. In comparison, focusing on non-recession months (i.e., ignoring the interaction term for now), the regression results in Table 3 imply that moving from the lowest quintile of the income distribution to the highest quintile changes OP T I NDX by a quarter, that is, by about a quarter of the peak-totrough movement in OP T I NDX. Having a college degree implies a change of about 6% of peak-to-trough OP T I NDX. For P ST K, the typical peak-tothrough movement in Figure 2 is about 0.30, and so a change from the lowest to the highest income quintile implies a change in P ST K of about half this amount. A change in the college education status implies a change in P ST K of about a quarter of the peak-to-trough movement. This comparison to businesscycle variation shows that the SES-related heterogeneity in expectations is substantial and economically significant.
The regression results in Table 3 further show that the size of the beliefs wedge between high-and low-SES individuals is state-dependent. Consistent with Figures 1 and 2 , the coefficient estimates on the interaction terms of the NBER recession indicator and either SES measure show that the SES-related wedge in expectations is significantly smaller during recessions. In the case of education, the effect of a college degree on OP T I NDX is two-thirds smaller during recessions (instead of 0.058, it is 0.058-0.039, or 0.019). The effect of income percentile rank is a quarter smaller (instead of 0.304, it is 0.304-0.076, or 0.228) during recessions, although Figure 1 shows that the wedge even completely disappeared between the lowest and highest income quintiles for a few months during the past three recessions.
Heterogeneity in forecast bias
Our analysis so far has documented two broad empirical patterns: first, lower-SES people hold more pessimistic macroeconomic beliefs, and second, during recessions, the difference in macroeconomic beliefs between those with high and low SES diminishes considerably. To understand the reasons for this time-varying beliefs wedge, it would be useful to know whether high-or low-SES individuals are closer to the "truth." Figuring this out is not quite a straightforward exercise, though.
First, it is not clear what the "truth"-that is, the rational forecast-is. With parameter and model uncertainty, we, as econometricians, do not have knowledge of the true model of macroeconomic dynamics. We deal with this issue by taking the medians from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) as our benchmark forecasts. These are arguably among the most sophisticated macroeconomic forecasts available. 5 The SPF does not have one-year stock market return forecasts, so we need a different benchmark for P ST K. We assume that stock returns are close to unpredictable, and so we use an estimate of the unconditional probability of a positive 12-month stock market return as benchmark. We estimate it based on the fraction of positive 12-month returns (using overlapping monthly windows) of the CRSP value-weighted index since 1926.
Second, for some of the expectations variables in the Michigan Survey, there is no directly corresponding forecast in the SPF. We deal with this issue as follows:
• UNEMP can be matched with the unemployment forecast in the SPF.
Since the Michigan Survey asks about the change in unemployment over the next 12 months, we compare it with the difference between the threequarter-ahead forecast, t +3 of the level of unemployment, and the end of the prior quarter t −1 "nowcast." 6 • For the three business conditions variables in the Michigan Survey, BEXP is the one that is closest to a change in real GDP, so we match BEXP with RGDP forecasts in the SPF. BEXP is based on the question, "And how about a year from now-Do you expect that in the country as a whole business conditions will be better, or worse than they are at present, or just about the same?" (see Table 1 ). It seems reasonable to think of good business conditions as a high RGDP growth rate and bad business conditions as a low RGDP growth rate, similar to typical classifications into recessions and non-recession periods. Therefore, we calculate a change in the forecasted growth rate of RGDP. Since the SPF contains RGDP-level forecasts, we calculate the average forecasted change in log GDP over the four quarters from the end of the current quarter t to quarter t +4, and we subtract the change from the end of the prior quarter, t −1 to t. • P ST K is matched to a benchmark computed from realized stock returns as explained above.
The third issue is that the UNEMP and BEXP variables in the Michigan Survey of Consumers are categorical and hence do not directly map into the continuous SPF unemployment and RGDP forecasts. To make them comparable, we discretize the SPF forecast based on the assumption that any forecasted change in the unemployment rate or the RGDP growth rate within one standard deviation (calculated over the full sample since 1978) above or below zero corresponds to the "Same" category for BEXP and UNEMP , while a change above or below corresponds to better or worse conditions for BEXP and more or less unemployment for UNEMP .
Finally, the SPF is conducted only quarterly, while the Michigan Survey is monthly. The SPF is carried out in the middle month each quarter. We match the first two Michigan Survey months each quarter with the SPF from the prior quarter and the Michigan Survey wave from the third month each quarter to the SPF from the same quarter. Thus, the Michigan Survey is lagged somewhat relative to the SPF. This seems reasonable, as professionals are presumably faster in noticing and reacting to very recent information. 7 Based on these definitions, we now calculate each month a forecast bias by subtracting from P ST K, BEXP , and UNEMP the corresponding value of the professional forecast. We then average these forecast biases for each (within age group-year) income percentile over the whole sample period. The results are presented in Figure 3 . The plots also include a local linear regression fitted based on those income percentile averages.
The top panel shows that forecasts of individuals in all income ranks are, on average, too pessimistic relative to historical stock market performance. But beliefs of high-income individuals are closest to the historical frequencies.
The middle panel presents the average forecast bias for RGDP. In this case, high-income individuals have forecasts that are on average unbiased, while low-income individuals are too pessimistic. The bottom panel shows that highincome individuals are close to getting the unemployment forecast right on average, while low-income individuals forecast an unemployment rate that is too high-that is, they are again too pessimistic.
In summary, the forecast bias results are consistent with our hypothesis that low SES induces pessimism. The fact that higher-income individuals' forecasts are closer to the "truth" is consistent with the notion that they are less prone to extrapolation from their own personal circumstances and experiences than low-income individuals.
Potentially confounding effects
Our hypothesis is that low SES causes pessimism. However, the correlation between SES and expectations in levels could potentially be explained by alternative theories as well. We now investigate whether such alternative factors could be driving the SES-expectations relationship. One possibility is that the beliefs wedge between high-and low-SES individuals could be driven by differences in financial literacy. Lack of financial literacy could perhaps induce low-SES people to be more confused, in a pessimistic manner, about the macroeconomy. To address this concern, in the analysis in Table 4 we estimate similar models as in Table 3 , but only for people with a college degree. We continue to find a significant and positive effect (0.252, p < 0.01) of Income Rank on people's aggregate expectations as measured by OP T I NDX. This effect is similar in magnitude to that estimated in the specification in the first column in Table 3 (i.e., 0.304). In other words, even among those with high education, we find that individuals earning more money are more optimistic about future macroeconomic developments than their lower-income peers.
More generally, there could be an underlying fixed personal characteristicfor example, vulnerability to depression-that causes both general pessimism as well as poor economic choices that lead to low SES. Puri and Robinson (2007) , for example, study the economic effects of dispositional optimism. This type of theory would imply an unobserved person fixed effect.
To address this issue, we use the panel subsample of the MSC. While most of the MSC sample consists of newly sampled respondents each month, a random subsample of them are reinterviewed once six months after the initial interview. We can use this panel structure to difference out unobserved fixed effects by looking at the relationship between changes in beliefs and changes in SES. Specifically, we use this panel dimension to re-run a version of the baseline regressions in Table 3 with the dependent variable (expectations) and explanatory variable (income rank) differenced over the six-month window between the initial interview and the reinterview. As Table 5 shows, with the change in OP T I NDX as the dependent variable, we still obtain a positive coefficient that is statistically significant. In terms of magnitude, it is about one-fourth of the coefficient in the levels regression in Table 3 , indicating that the change in personal income rank over a short period of six months accounts for a substantial portion of the levels effect that we identified in Table 3 . Thus, the fixed effects alternative mechanism is at best a partial explanation of the SES-expectations relationship. The regressions with the individual components of OP T I NDX in the other columns in Table 5 all have positive coefficients on the income rank change, and the difference from zero is statistically significant only for three out of the five variables.
The change in the size of the effect of SES on people's macroeconomic optimism as we move from the main sample of the Michigan Survey of Consumers (0.30; see Table 3 ) to the within-individual analysis in the panel subsample (0.07; see Table 5 ) is not surprising. First, it is possible that the SES that shapes people's expectations and decisions reflects only components of income, wealth, and other SES determinants that are perceived as permanent.
To the extent that transitory changes account for a substantial share of recent changes in income, differenced income rank captures changes in the permanent component, or long-run SES, only imperfectly. Whether people distinguish between transitory and permanent changes in this way is an interesting hypothesis that could be examined in a data set where a person's SES can be tracked over many years. In the MSC we only observe SES at most two times (six months apart) for one person, and this prevents us from measuring the relative effect of the recent versus long-run SES of an individual on his or her views about the macroeconomy. Second, and related, we would expect a substantial drop in the effect size from Table 3 to Table 5 due to measurement error. Transitory components of income could be one source of measurement error, but there is also likely a substantial survey response error. If measurement error in the level of SES has low serial correlation and true SES is persistent, the measurement error accounts for a much bigger fraction of the variation in the differences of measured SES than in the level of measured SES. As a consequence, attenuation bias in the differences regression is much bigger than in the levels regression. In Online Appendix C, we calibrate a measurement error model to match recent evidence in Hyslop and Townsend (forthcoming) from a comparison of survey responses and administrative panel data on individual earnings. These calculations suggest that measurement error can account for most and perhaps all of the drop in coefficient magnitude that we observe going from levels to differences in Tables 3 and 5 . Taken together, these results suggest that there is not much room for fixed personal characteristics to drive the results in our baseline levels specification. Some caution is warranted, though, as the dynamic properties of survey measurement error are generally not well understood-the Hyslop and Townsend (forthcoming) findings nothwithstanding-and so the precise magnitude of the measurement error distortion is difficult to pin down.
These differenced results also address a potential reverse causality story for our findings. Pessimistic beliefs could perhaps directly cause poor economic choices (e.g., portfolio and human capital investment decisions) that affect the SES measures that we use as explanatory variables in our baseline regressions. However, given the differenced panel regression results, this type of story seems a highly implausible explanation. To the extent that beliefs do affect choices, the effects of these choices on SES would presumably take much longer than six months to materialize in any significant way. Therefore, this story is an unlikely explanation for the contemporaneous correlation of belief changes and SES changes that we find in Table 5 .
We can use the full sample of the MSC, without relying on the panel structure, to provide further evidence that recent changes in economic circumstances affect individuals' expectations. Instead of direct measures of changes in income, we have to rely, however, on respondents' statements about past changes that they recall to have experienced. The survey variable we use for this purpose is the 1-Yr Change in Personal Situation, which can take the values -1, 0, or 1 to indicate whether people feel their finances have gotten worse, stayed the same, or improved in the past year.
The regressions reported in Table 6 in the second column add this variable to our baseline regression. Doing so raises the R 2 substantially, and it lowers the coefficients on income rank by about a third. Thus, the change in economic situation captured by the added variable absorbs part of the SES-level effect. While the interpretation is not as clean as in the differenced regression in Table 5 , it would be difficult to explain this strong relationship between OP T I NDX and recent changes in the survey respondents' personal financial situation under personal fixed effects or reverse causality stories.
One potential concern regarding this interpretation is that the value of the 1-Yr Change in Personal Situation variable may be an individual fixed characteristic, such that people who always say their situation has deteriorated recently are also people who always say the macroeconomy will fare poorly in the near future. However, as the analysis in Table 5 shows, macroeconomic expectations are not an individual fixed effect, since there is variation in this variable over time within individuals. Moreover, we find that there is substantial withinperson variation in people's response regarding their 1-Yr Change in Personal Situation and no persistence: the autocorrelation of these perceived changes in overlapping one-year windows from the two interviews taken six months apart is only 0.41-roughly what one would expect if there is zero autocorrelation for non-overlapping periods. Furthermore, as shown in Table A3 in the Online Appendix, within-person changes in individuals' perceptions about the change in their economic standing in the past year are significantly correlated with within-person changes in these individuals' macroeconomic optimism, whether we examine the overall optimism measure (OP T I NDX) or the individual expectations measures that constitute this index. Another concern is that individual-specific variation in mood could lead to spurious correlation between self-reported SES measures and reported macroeconomic beliefs in our baseline regressions. For example, someone who is depressed at the time of the interview might report a pessimistic expectation and, at the same time, provide the interviewer with an underestimate of her income. As a consequence, there could be a spurious positive correlation between income rank and macroeconomic expectation. Our results already indicate to some extent that this story is unlikely to be important since education, in addition to income rank, also plays an important role in shaping expectations. While underestimation of income rank by an individual in a depressed state may be plausible, underreporting of their own education level does not seem plausible. Nonetheless, a concern about spurious correlation of beliefs and income could remain.
To address this concern, we add local economic condition variables to the regression that are based on official economic statistics rather than on self-reports by survey respondents. Specifically, we use county-level data on the unemployment rate (monthly, from the Bureau of Labor Statistics) and the level of personal income (annually, in December 2014 dollars, from the Bureau of Economic Analysis) for the 2000-2014 period. 8 As Table 6 shows, these local economic condition variables help explain cross-sectional variation in macroeconomic beliefs. Both are statistically significant, and in terms of magnitudes, a decrease of 0.5% in the local unemployment rate or an increase of $1,000 in local income has the same effect as a one-percentile increase in the personal income rank of an individual. An alternative approach (untabulated) is to use the local economic conditions variables as instruments for income rank. Instrumented in this way, income rank still enters the regression significantly.
Finally, it is possible that survey respondents do not understand that they are asked to provide their beliefs about the macroeconomy, but instead, they think they need to provide their beliefs about their local economy. Several aspects of the data alleviate this concern. First, the questions used by the MSC clearly use words such as "changes in national unemployment," with the goal of having respondents think about the macroeconomy when answering these questions. Second, the concern that people are simply reporting economic developments in their local area is unlikely to apply to the question regarding expectations about the return of the U.S. stock market, since there is no stock market at the local (e.g., county or state) level. Third, we found evidence inconsistent with the idea that respondents' answers are correlated with economic changes in the county where they reside. We specifically examined expectations about the unemployment rate. If respondents simply provide to the MSC their beliefs about unemployment rate changes in their local community, this would lead to the empirical patterns we observe in the paper if low-SES respondents live in areas with worse changes in unemployment during our sample period than the areas where the high-SES respondents live. We checked whether this condition holds. That is, we examined whether changes in unemployment year to year, objectively measured, are worse in counties where the low-SES respondents reside, relative to counties where high-SES respondents live. Figure A5 in the Online Appendix shows that this is not the case. If anything, during our sample period, 12-month unemployment rate changes were worse in counties where high-SES respondents live. With SES defined by the level of education, we find no significant difference between the changes in 12-month unemployment in counties where respondents with a college education reside, relative to those where people without a college education live. Hence it is unlikely that our main results are simply an indication that respondents just describe what objectively is happening in their local community.
Overall, the results in this section are supportive of a robust and causal effect of SES on beliefs. Unobserved personal fixed effects, reverse causality, and spurious correlation through correlated measurement error can at most play a partial role, but they cannot be the main reasons for the strong empirical relationship between SES and macroeconomic expectations.
Importance of SES-Driven Expectations for Household Choices
The results so far indicate that a person's socioeconomic situation shapes their beliefs about future macro-level economic conditions, such that higher-SES individuals hold more optimistic beliefs about future stock returns, unemployment, and business conditions. In the next step of the analysis, our goal is to quantify the impact that SES has, through its influence on beliefs, on households' economic choices.
It is natural to expect that aspects of a person's SES will have a direct effect on that person's economic choices. For example, higher-income individuals or those who are better educated are likely to be in a better position to invest in stocks relative to lower-income individuals, perhaps because of access to retirement accounts at work, lower participation costs relative to wealth, or simply because they have money left to save after paying their bills each month. Similarly, higher-SES individuals are less likely to face financial constraints and thus are more likely to consider purchasing homes, cars, or durable goods. Therefore, the total effect of SES on household choices comes from two sources: (i) the direct effect of SES on these choices-for example, because higher income leads to easier access to retirement accounts, and (ii) the indirect effect of SES on these choices through the belief channel-for example, because higher-SES individuals hold more optimistic beliefs about the distribution of stock returns, or other macroeconomic developments.
We can measure the relative importance of the direct and indirect effects of SES on people's economic choices using the analysis in Table 7 . The dependent variables in Columns 2-6 capture the respondent's investments in stocks (I nvest and Invest Share) and their assessment that it is a good time to purchase homes, durables, or cars (H OM, DU R, CAR). The explanatory variables include our two SES dimensions (income rank and education), as well as the person's aggregate belief about future macroeconomic conditions (OP T I NDX). If beliefs were measured without error, we could use OLS estimates of the coefficients on OP T I NDX in these regressions combined with the results from the regression of OP T I NDX on the SES variables in the first column to calculate how much of the effect of SES on choices is direct (SES ⇒ Choice) and how much of it is indirect (SES ⇒ Macroeconomic expectations ⇒ Choice). There is, however, substantial measurement error in OP T I NDX. People's willingness and ability to carefully and precisely state their expectations in a survey is arguably limited, and their responses could be influenced by random mood fluctuations that are not substantial and persistent enough to have consequences for economic choices. This measurement problem is likely much more severe for a relatively elusive concept like expectations of "general business conditions" than for a relatively clearly defined concept like family income or education level. In this sense, including a substantially mis-measured OP T I NDX along with more precisely measured SES variables in the regression could lead to a severe underestimation of the role of OP T I NDX. Alternatively, rather than attenuation of the OP T I NDX coefficient, this type of measurement error could also induce spurious correlation between the choice measures and OP T I NDX if the mood fluctuations of the survey respondents affect the responses to the choice questions as well.
To address these issues, we return to the panel subsample of the MSC, and we use each respondent's lagged OP T I NDX from the prior interview six months earlier as an instrumental variable (IV) for current OP T I NDX. If measurement error and high-frequency mood fluctuations (e.g., due to a bad night's sleep) have sufficiently low persistence that they are not predictable with OP T I NDX measured six months earlier, then this IV approach removes the inconsistency caused by these distortions. The first-stage results from our IV estimation are reported in the Online Appendix in Table A4 .
The direct effects of the two SES measures on household choices are given by the estimated regression coefficients in the models in Table 7 for each of the two measures. As expected, we find that higher-SES people are more likely to participate in the stock market, to invest more money relative to their income in equities, and to believe that it is a good time to purchase homes, cars, or durable goods. For example, the regression in the second column in Table 7 shows that an income rank increase from the lowest to the highest rank corresponds to a 71% (p <0.01) increase in the probability that the person invests in stocks. This is a large effect, considering that in our data, as shown in the summary statistics in Table 2 , 62% of respondents invest in the stock market. Individuals with a college or higher education have a 10% (p <0.01) higher probability of investing in stocks, compared with those less educated. Similarly, the results in the third column in Table 7 show that people with higher incomes and a college or higher education, conditional on investing in equities, have a higher amount of money, expressed as a fraction of their annual income, invested in stocks.
The regression models in the last three columns in Table 7 show that, in general, both dimensions of SES are significant and positive predictors of people's assessment that it is a good time to purchase a home, a car, or durable goods. For example, having a college or higher education translates into an improvement of 0.065 (p <0.01) in the person's attitude toward buying a home, which is sizable, given that the mean of this variable is 0.384 in our sample. The effect of increasing one's income rank by one quintile on the attitude toward buying a home is similar in magnitude (0.311 × 0.2 = 0.06, p <0.01) to that of having a college education. When the dependent variable captures the attitude toward buying durables or cars, the estimated direct effects of the change in income rank from the lowest to the highest are 0.156 and 0.263, respectively (both effects at p <0.01). The only exception is that college-educated people are not significantly different from those without a college degree in asserting that it is a good time to purchase durables. In terms of car buying, the direct effect of college education is an increase of 0.044 (p <0.01) in attitude. 9 Since in the regression models in Table 7 we control for the person's beliefs about future macroeconomic conditions, as measured by his or her overall optimism, OP T I NDX, the above effects of SES on the person's decisions regarding investments and purchases represent the direct effects of SES on these decisions, holding fixed any indirect effects of SES through the belief channel.
To measure the indirect effects of SES, and the relative importance of the direct versus the indirect effects, we follow the standard methodology used in mediation analysis. The results, presented in Table 8 , show that SES changes household choices through both the direct channel and the indirect, beliefrelated, channel.
For example, looking at the decision to invest or not in stocks (first row in Table 8 ), the direct effect of an increase of 10 percentiles in a person's income rank is an increase of 0.0714 in the probability of investing, as shown in the regression analysis in Table 7 . The indirect effect of the same increase in the income rank, through the belief channel, is equal to the product of two quantities: the coefficient estimate on Income Rank in the regression model predicting the belief OP T I NDX in the first column of Table 7 , and the coefficient estimate on OP T I NDX in the regression model from Table 7 that predicts the I nvest variable. Thus, the indirect effect is 0.0324×0.057 = 0.00184. The total effect of an increase of 10 percentiles in a person's income rank on the probability of investing in stocks is the sum of the direct (0.0714) and indirect (0.0018) effects, namely 0.0733. The importance of the indirect, belief-related channel is given by the ratio of the indirect to total effect, which is equal to 2.52%. In other words, a person's income rank is a positive predictor of the decision to invest in stocks, and about 2.52% of the positive effect of income on the probability to invest is attributable to the beliefs that the person holds about future macroeconomic conditions. The rest of the effect is attributable to other income-related factors that are not about differences in beliefs. The importance of the indirect beliefs channel is higher for other SES measures and household decisions. For example, analyzing the decision to invest in stocks, the indirect channel accounts for 3.06% of the positive effect of a college education. When analyzing the share of income invested in stocks, the indirect, belief-related channel accounts for 18.26% of the positive effect of higher income rank and 3.87% of the positive effect of a college education. When analyzing people's home-buying attitude, the indirect, belief-related channel accounts for 24.28% of the positive effect of higher income rank and 20.75% of the positive effect of a college education. The indirect, beliefs-related channel accounts for 39.29% of the positive effect of higher income rank on attitudes toward durables purchases, and for 30.82% of the positive effects of either higher income rank or higher education on attitudes toward car purchases. Thus, the effects of SES on household choices and attitudes are in part driven by the differences in macroeconomic expectations of people with different SES. 10 We interpret the respondents' answers regarding household decisions-such as choices concerning investing in the stock market or attitudes toward buying homes, cars, and durable goods-as good proxies for these individuals' actual economic behavior. That being said, we do not have administrative data to verify these survey answers. However, there are two reasons to believe that people's survey responses are truthful.
First, as shown earlier in our analysis, there is a clear relationship between respondents' expectations and their own household decisions as reported during the survey, which implies that the data on decisions cannot be simply noise. This correlation between expectations and behavior is also found at the aggregate level, as shown, for example, in Carroll, Fuhrer, and Wilcox (1994) , who document that the degree of optimism in MSC expectations is a strong positive predictor of the change over the following year in the aggregate level of personal consumption, including purchases of cars, other goods, and services.
Second, the survey measures of household behavior are strong predictors of aggregate macroeconomic outcomes. For example, Cai, Deggendorf, and Wilcox (2015) find that the MSC aggregate response regarding whether it is a good time to buy a home is a strong and positive predictor of the volume of transactions in the housing market measured over the following year. In additional analyses of our own we find that the MSC respondents' monthly aggregate attitude DU R regarding purchasing durables is highly correlated (ρ = 0.5, p <0.01) with the aggregate contemporaneous monthly demand for durable goods, obtained from the FRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Similarly, we find that there is a high correlation (ρ = 0.6, p <0.01) between the MSC aggregate monthly attitude CAR toward buying cars, and the contemporaneous total car sales reported in the FRED database. 11 Therefore, while we cannot verify for each respondent whether their household decisions are truthfully reported, at least we observe that in the aggregate, the reports of individuals in the MSC correspond to actual macroeconomic outcomes.
So far in the analysis we have related several decisions of individuals to their aggregate belief about future economic conditions, OP T I NDX. We will now turn toward analyzing a specific aspect of these beliefs, namely, the subjective probability that the U.S. stock market return will be positive over the next year (P ST K), to understand how it relates to the respondents' decisions regarding making investments in stocks.
While SES-related variables such as income and participation costs influence whether a household invests in the stock market (e.g., Vissing-Jorgensen 2002), our results so far suggest that SES-driven variation in beliefs about stock returns may also explain the variation across SES levels in terms of the decision to 11 The durable goods demand data and the total car sales data are available on the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGORDER, and https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TOTALSA, respectively. For our analysis we detrend these monthly time series to account for population growth. invest, and the fraction of income invested in stocks. We thus investigate the relative importance of the SES-related stock market belief channel, relative to that of other SES-related factors, on stock investment decisions. The results in Table 9 indicate that SES measures, as well as P ST K, are positive predictors of a person's decision to invest in equities and, conditional on investing, of the share of income invested in stocks. The relative importance of the direct effect of SES measures, and their indirect effect through expectations, is illustrated in the results in Table 10 . In Columns 2 and 3 in Table 9 , P ST K is instrumented with six-month prior P ST K. The first stage results for these regressions are reported in the Online Appendix in Table A6 .
As expected, the results in Table 9 show that, controlling for the belief about stock market returns, our SES measures are positive and significant predictors of both the decision to invest as well as of the share of income invested in stocks. In other words, income rank and education directly influence a household's stock market investment decisions. However, as shown in our analysis in Table 3 and in the first column in Table 9 , these SES measures also affect P ST K, the belief about whether the stock market return will be positive over the next year, which by itself, as seen in Table 9 , influences households' decisions whether, and how much, to invest in stocks. 12 12 A possible concern is that there is a mechanical correlation between the expectations expressed by survey respondents and their declared choices, stemming from people's desire to look "consistent" in their survey answers. Specifically, an individual who declared that he does not invest in the stock market may later express
The coefficient estimates in Table 9 allow us to estimate the direct and indirect (via the belief channel) effects of each of the SES measures on stock market investment decisions. Specifically, increasing a person's income rank by 10 percentiles increases the probability of stock market participation by 0.0625, and the share of income invested by 0.0229. The indirect effects of the same change in income rank on these two outcomes, through the belief channel, are obtained by multiplying the coefficient estimates on P ST K in the first column in Table 9 and those in the second and third columns, respectively. Namely, the indirect effects of increasing the income rank by 10 percentiles on the probability of participation and on the share of income invested in stocks are increases of about 0.016 × 0.424 = 0.0068 and 0.016 × 1.251 = 0.02, respectively. The indirect effect of higher income, though inducing more optimistic beliefs about the stock market, represents 9.76% of the total effect of income on the participation decision (= 0.0625 + 0.0068) and 46.58% of its total effect on the share of income invested in stocks (= 0.0229 + 0.02).
When examining the effects of education on the decision to invest in stocks and on the share of income invested, we also find sizable indirect effects of this SES measure on the two decisions. Specifically, following the same procedure described earlier for quantifying the direct and indirect effects of income rank on stock investment decisions, we find that having a college degree increases the probability of investing in stocks by 9.5%, and 32.38% of this total effect of education on participation is coming from the indirect, belief-related channel. Also, having a college or better education increases the share of income invested in stocks by 32.6%, and the fraction of this total effect that is driven by the belief channel is 27.87%. These results are summarized in Table 10 .
Thus, we find that people who have higher incomes and are more educated are more likely to invest in stocks and are willing to invest more of their income in these assets, and this is in part because they hold more optimistic beliefs about the stock market return distribution. Importantly, these effects are not limited to people from a specific region of the SES distribution, such as, for example, people with high education. In Table A7 in the Online Appendix we estimate a similar model as in Table 9 but separately for people with and without a college degree. The results show that respondents' expectations about future stock market returns, captured by the variable PSTK, have similar effects on people's decisions about investing in equities, across both high-and loweducation participants.
Behavioral Interpretation
We now discuss possible behavioral interpretations of the SES-related heterogeneity in macroeconomic expectations. This is not meant to be an pessimistic expectations about future stock market returns, to justify to himself and the experimenter why he holds no equities. Fortunately, the survey design used by the MSC staff alleviates this concern, because people are first asked to estimate the probability that the stock market will have a positive return, and only later are asked to calculate how much money, if any, they invest in stocks. exhaustive account of all possible behavioral explanations. There may be others than the ones that we discuss below that are observationally equivalent in terms of their implications for macroeconomic expectations. We focus on a small number of potential explanations that seem particularly plausible in this setting. We then offer some additional empirical evidence on heterogeneity in the perception of economic news that sheds some light on the relative merits of these explanations. While we do not believe that these tests can conclusively discriminate between these different behavioral interpretations, they are, at a minimum, suggestive about promising avenues for further research.
Theories of low-SES pessimism
Our main finding so far-that low-SES individuals are pessimistic on average in their macroeconomic expectations and the expectations wedge between highand low-SES individuals is substantially bigger in booms than in recessionsis perhaps most naturally explained by a tendency of low-SES people to put too much weight on their personal economic situation and too little weight on objective signals about the state of the macroeconomy. To express this hypothesis more precisely, consider a setting in which the true latent state of the economy is given by an IID random variable w t , with ω t ∼ N (0,σ 2 ω ), which is unobservable at t, but known one period later. Individuals are endowed with a prior belief about w t with prior mean μ 0 that is influenced by their personal economic situation. Before seeing any macroeconomic data-in the present or historical data from the past-μ 0 would represent their expectation of ω t . However, we assume that relative to objective historical information about past realizations of ω t , this personal-environment prior belief is uninformative. Thus, a rational individual with access to a long data set of historical data would come into period t with a data-based prior belief, p(ω t ), that reflects the population distribution ω t ∼ N (0,σ 2 ω ). After receiving a noisy macroeconomic signal at time t,
where e t ∼ N (0,σ 2 ),
application of Bayes' rule yields a posterior distribution with mean
which is the result of putting weight γ on the signal, weight 1−γ on the objective prior mean (which is zero), and zero weight on μ 0 . We use E [.] to denote expectations under the posterior beliefs of this rational individual. Under posterior beliefs, we can decompose ω t into an expected and unexpected component
Now consider a low-SES individual who underestimates the informativeness of objective signals and historical data compared with the prior belief based on his or her personal economic situation, perhaps because of a lack of trust in the informativeness of expert opinions, economic news, and other sources of macroeconomic information. 13 In terms of the model above, we can think of low-SES individuals putting some weight β, 0<β ≤ 1, on the personalenvironment prior μ 0 . Given that the personal economic environment is less favorable for low-SES individuals, and the fact that conditioning on current low SES also tends to select individuals who are more likely to have experienced recent bad shocks to their economic situation, we have μ 0 < 0 for low-SES individuals. Then,Ẽ
[ω t |s t ]=(1−β)γ s t +βμ 0 ,
whereẼ [.] denotes expectations under these biased beliefs. Taking the difference with Equation (2), we obtain the bias
which is strongly negative following a good signal (s t > 0) and small or even positive after a bad signal (s t < 0). Thus, there is a pessimism bias on average, and the bias shrinks following bad signals, consistent with our empirical findings. But there are alternative plausible behavioral biases that could give rise to similar expectations. For example, in the local thinking framework of Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010) and Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2012) , the decision maker neglects states that he or she does not view as representative. Within our continuous-state model, we can introduce local thinking through a truncated normal prior belief, where a normal distribution with mean zero and variance σ 2 ω is truncated to ω t ≤ a 0 . Good states ω t >a 0 are neglected in the sense that they are assigned a probability of zero in the prior belief and therefore also in the posterior one. Following Equation (3), this implies that only states with
are considered possible. Applying Bayes' rule with this truncated prior belief, and using the properties of the truncated normal distribution, we obtain the posterior meañ
where φ(.) and (.) are the standard-normal probability density function and cumulative distribution function, respectively, and ψ is the posterior variance 13 Recent experimental evidence on house price expectations in Fuster, Perez-Truglia, and Zafar (2018) points toward such misperception of informativeness. They find that when low-SES individuals are offered a chance to acquire an informative signal about future house prices, low-SES individuals are less likely than high-SES individuals to pick the most informative signal.
of u t without truncation. Taking the difference with Equation (2), we obtain the biasẼ
which is always negative, and more so for high s t . For large s t (good signal), the bias is approximately −γ s t , completely canceling the signal in Equation (7), and for strongly negative s t (bad signal), the bias is approximately zero. Thus, in terms of the behavior of subjective beliefs, the local thinking framework can deliver predictions that are similar to those from the misperceived signal informativeness hypothesis. Similar expectations could also result from a misinterpretation of the signal in the form of a confirmation bias as in Rabin and Schrag (1999) . Consider an individual who forms beliefs as in the rational case above, with the only exception being that good signals are sometimes misperceived by low-SES individuals as bad signals-and more likely so the better the signal. More precisely, suppose that the probability that the signal is misperceived is equal to 1−P (ω t <a 0 |s t ) (which implies that the probability of misperception goes to one as s t →∞ and to zero as s t →−∞), then,
If we further assume that
which means that if a signal is misperceived, it is, on average, perceived as a signal associated with a relatively bad state of the world ω t <a 0 , then we obtain exactly the same subjective expectations as in the local thinking case in Equation (8).
We also note that a model based on ambiguity aversion could potentially produce observationally equivalent predictions for individuals' economic choices. Ambiguity aversion induces an individual to make choices as if he or she were pessimistic (Hansen and Sargent 2001) , and ambiguity about signal precision can induce an asymmetric reaction to news (Epstein and Schneider 2008) . To the extent that low-SES individuals are more ambiguity averse-perhaps along the lines of Heath and Tversky (1991) , because they feel less competent than high-SES individuals in judging the macroeconomic outlook-this could explain why low-SES individuals make choices as if they were pessimistic. However, unlike the biased-beliefs models above, the ambiguity aversion model does not make clear predictions for the beliefs that individuals report in a survey. That an individual makes choices as if she were pessimistic does not imply that the individual would report pessimistic beliefs when asked about her expectations in a survey. Bhandari, Borovička, and Ho (2016) , for example, assume so, but this is an additional assumption that does not follow from ambiguity aversion theory.
In terms of the predictions for subjective expectations of low-SES individuals in booms and recessions, the three behavioral theories-misperception of informativeness, local thinking, and conformation bias-can all deliver similar predictions matching our basic results. The theories would differ more in terms of their predictions for how individuals repeatedly update their beliefs after observing a sequence of signals. Unfortunately, our data has a very short panel dimension that allows us to observe at most one change in expectations at the individual level, which makes a multi-period study of individual updating behavior impossible. However, there is some information on economic news perception in the MSC that can help to at least tentatively shed some light on the relative merits of these three theories.
News perception
The MSC contains a variable that elicits the volume and tone of business news that survey respondents report to have heard recently. We can think of this variable as roughly capturing the news associated with the public signal s t . Specifically, the variable Business News Heard takes the value of −2,−1,0,1, or 2, depending on how many business news items the respondent reported having heard recently (0, 1, or 2), and whether these items were positive or negative in nature (as coded by the MSC interviewer). A value of 2 means the respondent reported having heard two pieces of positive business news, while a value of -2 means the respondent reported having heard two pieces of negative business news. A value of 1 indicates the responded only reported having heard one piece of business news, and that it was positive. If the one piece of news heard was negative, the value of Business News Heard would be -1. Finally, this variable has the value 0 if either the respondent did not recall hearing any business news lately, or whether one piece of news recalled was positive, and another was negative.
To map this into the model, we assume that survey respondents are more likely to report having heard a piece of news when the signal s t is big enough relative to its perceived signal noise. Thus, when low-SES individuals underestimate the informativeness of s t , the perceived news should be dampened compared with the rational Bayesian case (i.e., high-SES individuals). In the local thinking case, all distortion is in the prior belief, but the signal perception is undistorted. Hence, we would expect that there is no difference in news heard between high-and low-SES individuals. In the confirmation bias case, the signal perception is distorted asymmetrically: low-SES individuals should perceive more bad news in good times, but there should be little difference in news perception in bad times.
To check these predictions, we run regressions of the Business News Heard variable on our SES variables and their interaction with the NBER recession indicator. The results are reported in Table 11 . As the table shows, individuals with higher income perceive more positive business news outside of recessions. The point estimate is also positive for high education, but not statistically significant. However, in recessions, the effect switches sign, and very strongly so: High-SES survey respondents report having heard much worse news in recessions. For example, for income rank, the estimated effect in recessions is 0.07−0.25 = −0.18. These results fit well with the misperceived informativeness story, where signal perception is the same on average, but low-SES individuals underreact to the signal in either direction. 14 These results do not fit as well to the local thinking and confirmation bias theories. In the local thinking theory, there should not be a difference in signal perception. In the confirmation bias story, the wedge in news perception should be big in good times, and very small in bad times. This is not what we find in the regression.
One caveat to this interpretation is that the news variable might not really capture the signal s t , but is rather just another way for survey respondents to express their beliefs about the state of the economy. If so, the news variable would capture the same information as the macroeconomic expectations variables. One finding that goes against this alternative view is that, unlike for the macroeconomic expectations, there is no difference in news perception on average between high-and low-SES individuals.
Another way of seeing this is to use the news variable as an explanatory variable in the expectations regressions from Table 3 . If the news variable captured the same information as the expectations variables, then controlling for the news variable should eliminate the relationship between SES and The table presents OLS regressions of macroeconomic expectations on SES measures while controlling for the business news heard by the survey respondents. The variable Business News Heard takes the value of -2, -1, 0, 1, or 2, depending on how many business news the respondents reported having heard recently (0, 1, or 2), and the sign indicates whether the news were positive or negative. This variable has the value 0 if the respondent did not recall hearing any business news lately, or if one piece of news recalled was positive and another was negative. Controls include dummies for year-month, age, gender, and marital status. Standard errors are clustered by individual and year-month, and t-statistics are shown in parentheses.
expectations. The results in Table 12 show that this is not the case. We find that the higher the value of Business News Heard-that is, the more positive economic news people have heard lately-the more optimistic they are when assessing future macroeconomic conditions, which is a natural result. Importantly, however, we continue to find that the respondents' income rank and education remain strong and positive drivers of their macroeconomic optimism. The news variable is therefore not simply a restatement of individuals' macroeconomic expectations. Interestingly, the cyclicality in the wedge disappears when we control for Business News Heard: The coefficients on the interactions with the recession indicator become smaller in magnitude or statistically insignificant. This is exactly what one would expect according to the misperceived informativeness story. Controlling for the news perception wedge βs t in Equation (5) absorbs time variation in the beliefs wedge and leaves a constant bias equal to βμ 0 . In contrast, in the local thinking story, there should not be a difference in news perception between high-and low-SES individuals and so controlling for it should not affect the coefficients on the SES variables and their interactions with the recession indicator. This is not what we find. In the confirmation bias story, the bias arises from signal misperception, so controlling for signal misperception should eliminate the entire beliefs wedge, not just the timevarying component (unless one supplements the confirmation bias story with an additional strong pessimistic prior belief related to SES).
Overall, we view these news-based tests as suggestive that the time-varying pessimism of low-SES individuals likely arises from underweighting of public signals compared with information obtained from one's personal economic environment. But our ability to discriminate between the different behavioral theories based on MSC data is quite limited. For this reason, this conclusion should be viewed as preliminary. While further attempts to discriminate with different data or experiments are beyond the scope of this paper, this seems like an interesting area for future research.
Conclusion
Using a sample of more than 180,000 responses from participants in the Michigan Survey of Consumers each month from 1978 to 2014, we show that socioeconomic status has a strong influence on individuals' beliefs about future macroeconomic conditions, such as changes in unemployment, business conditions in general, and stock market performance. Specifically, we find that higher-SES individuals-namely, those with higher income and higher education-are more optimistic about future macroeconomic conditions. Moreover, the beliefs wedge between high-and low-SES individuals is strongly procyclical: in recessions, the beliefs wedge almost disappears.
This SES-related heterogeneity in macroeconomic expectations in turn has significant effects on people's economic choices. Specifically, we find that the relative macroeconomic optimism of individuals with higher SES is in part responsible for these households' higher propensity to invest in stocks or to be inclined to purchase homes, cars, or durable goods.
We show that the differences in macroeconomic expectations across SES groups could be theoretically predicted by models of belief formation in which low-SES individuals either underestimate the informativeness of public signals and as a result underweight them relative to their prior beliefs, or are more prone to local thinking, or to confirmation bias, relative to high-SES individuals. The available data do not allow for conclusive tests to assess the relative importance of these possible explanations, but the evidence seems most in line with the mechanism whereby low-SES individuals underestimate the informativeness of public signals about the state of the economy.
Our findings suggest that differences in macroeconomic expectations across people with different socioeconomic standing could potentially contribute to wealth inequality in the population over time, since these expectations influence household decisions such as investing in stocks or in real estate. An interesting avenue for future work is to quantify the importance of divergence in expectations across SES strata for the dynamics of the wealth distribution in the population, possibly by incorporating the SES-related belief heterogeneity in models like those of Piketty (1995) , Favilukis (2013) , and Gabaix et al. (2016) . The implications for wealth distribution are not quite straightforward. For example, while high-SES individuals' beliefs about stock market returns appear to be less biased on average than the more pessimistic beliefs of low-SES individuals, the fact that the optimism about stock returns of high-SES people is more procyclical may imply that they mis-time the stock market, which tends to have countercyclical expected returns. We believe that this is a fruitful direction for future research.
